Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant

*Being and Time*, Heidegger praises Kant as “the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves” (SZ: 23). Kant was, before Husserl (and perhaps, in Heidegger's mind, more than him), a true phenomenologist in the sense that the need to curtail the pretension of dogmatic metaphysics to overstep the boundaries of sensible experience led him to focus on phenomena and the conditions of their disclosure: thus, the “question of the inner possibility of such knowledge of the super-sensible, however, is presented as thrown back upon the more general question of the inner possibility of a general making-manifest (Offenbarmachen) of beings (Seiende) as such” (GA 3: 10, emphasis supplied). So Kant shouldn’t be read as an epistemologist (contrary to Descartes, for example), but as an ontologist: “Kant's inquiry is concerned with what determines nature as such -- occurrent beings as such -- and with how this ontological determinability is possible” (GA 25: 75). Heidegger sees this investigation into the “ontological determinability” of entities as an *a priori* form of inquiry: “what is already opened up and projected in advance i.e the horizon of ontological determinability . . . is what in a certain sense is “earlier” than a being and is called *a priori*” (GA 25: 37). This *a priori* character of ontological determinability forms the main link between Kant's critical project and fundamental ontology, itself characterised as a form of transcendental philosophy: “transcendental knowledge is a knowledge which investigates the possibility of an understanding of being, a pre-ontological understanding of being. And such an investigation is the task of ontology. *Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, i.e. a priori knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings*” (GA 25: 186). Thus Heidegger presents his own inquiry into the nature of Being as a way to address the same issue as Kant: “what is asked about is Being -- that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity” (SZ: 6, emphasis supplied). So Heidegger agrees with Kant on the object of the investigation (the determination of entities), and on the idea that the structure of ontological determination is not itself ontical. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which

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1 Heidegger’s main writings on Kant are *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s 1927 course (*A Phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, GA 25), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929, GA 3) and the section of the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 24) devoted to “Kant’s thesis about Being.” Among the later texts, *What is a Thing?* (GA 41) is the most relevant, and recontextualises Heidegger’s reading of Kant within the history of Being.

2 This is also the reason why Heidegger was so opposed to the interpretation of the *First Critique* put forward in his own time by N. Hartmann. This is made particularly clear by GA 25: 75-6, where Heidegger criticises the three successive “mistakes” (metaphysical, epistemological, psychological) made in interpreting Kant.
Heidegger modifies the Kantian definition of the *a priori*, and, more generally, whether his project of describing the non-ontic structure of our understanding of being is enough to make him a transcendental philosopher -- and if so, of which kind.

There are many ways in which this question, central for a paper concerned with Heidegger's *appropriation* (and not merely interpretation) of Kant, can be spelled out. William Blattner’s analysis of the two meanings of the transcendental in Kant is helpful here as a starting point (Blattner 1999: 236). According to him, the idea of a transcendental standpoint can refer to the position (which Blattner calls “epistemological”) one occupies when inquiring into the *a priori* conditions for the possibility of knowledge and thus, in the more Heideggerian terms I have used so far, into the non-ontic conditions of ontological determinability. But it can also refer to the standpoint resulting from the bracketing of these conditions, when one inquires about the nature of things regardless of the conditions under which they are disclosed to us (what Blattner calls the properly “transcendental” standpoint). Most commentators, even the ones who, like Hubert Dreyfus, don’t see Heidegger as a transcendental philosopher, would probably agree that there is a transcendental element in fundamental ontology in the first of these two senses. Although he insists that Dasein cannot be properly understood in a decontextualised, word-less manner, the way in which Heidegger spells out the structure of the existentials is transcendental in that it requires a shift from the *post hoc* (beings) to the *a priori* (Being), and inquires about our understanding of being as a set of non causal, non compositional conditions for the determination of entities (what Taylor Carman, for example, openly refers to the Allisonian notion of an “epistemic condition” and calls “hermeneutic conditions”. Thus Taylor Carman sees these conditions as expanding on Allison’s notion of an “epistemic condition.” See Allison 1983: 10 ff.). However, there is considerable dissent on whether Heidegger can (or should) be understood as a transcendental philosopher in the second of the above mentioned senses: Blattner is (to my knowledge) the only one who holds that the stronger notion of the transcendental standpoint as a bracketing of the epistemological perspective is operative in Heidegger, while others, in particular Dreyfus (1991: 253-65), Taylor Carman (2003: 157-203) and David Cerbone (see CERBONE) think that the thrust of Heidegger's position lies precisely in refuting the possibility (or at least showing the philosophical futility) of such a standpoint.

Similarly, commentators disagree on the question of whether there is anything like transcendental determination in Heidegger's work. Another useful distinction here can be borrowed from Mark Sacks, who differentiates between what he calls “transcendental constraints” and “transcendental features” (Sacks 2003: 211-8). The first indicates a “dependence of empirical possibilities on a non-empirical structure” (Sacks 2003: 213). It denotes a strong sense of transcendental determination, in which the conditions of such a determination are definable in isolation and in anticipation of what they determine (in the way the transcendental organisation of the faculties can be spelled out completely independently of experience in Kant, and in such a way that experience must conform to them). Transcendental features, on the contrary, “indicate the limitations implicitly determined by a range of available practices . . . to which further alternatives cannot be made intelligible to those engaged in them” (ibid.). They refer to a much weaker sense of transcendental determination, as (in Heidegger's case) the fact that beings are dependent, to be disclosed, on our having an understanding of Being which, while is not ontic, is nevertheless historically situated and thus dependent on ontic practices. Most people, I think, would agree that our having an understanding of Being can be
construed as a transcendental feature. However, few would grant that there is anything like a transcendental constraint in Heidegger's work -- Blattner being, again, the only one who holds this view (by arguing, firstly, that ontology does not depend upon, and is not open to refutation and revision by empirical, scientific inquiry, and, secondly, that from the fact that there is an a priori connection between Being and temporality, one can infer that entities must have a temporal structure).

Thus the really problematic question is not whether Heidegger can be construed as a transcendental philosopher in general, but a) whether anything of substantial importance rides on his being able to endorse the transcendental standpoint in the strong sense, and b) whether fundamental ontology involves anything like a transcendental constraint. I shall begin with the second point, and focus on the problem of transcendental determination (what Heidegger calls the “ontological determinability”, or the “constitution of Being” of entities (GA 25: 37). This, in turn, raises a very difficult question: what does Heidegger mean by “entity” (Seiende)? He clearly uses the word as a generic term for what there is, without any of the specific connotations linked to the notions of “object” (Objekt) (as a mental representation) or “thing” (Ding) (as what gathers, in the later work). But how do entities relate to what he calls the “phenomenon” (Phänomen)? In which sense can entities be said to be “phenomena” (phainomena)? In particular, by “entity”, should we understand something as it is in itself, independently of the conditions of its disclosure, and which we could know independently of such conditions? Or does the word “entity” structurally involve a form of ontological determination, in which case it would be impossible to dissociate its what-being (as a disclosed entity) from the “how” of its disclosure (although as we shall see, it would be wrong to think the former single-handedly determined by the latter, as in subjective idealism)? And if such is the case, how does our knowledge of entities relate to what is?

The problem is that Being and Time is very ambiguous on this point, and both sides can find substantiating quotes. Thus, while Blattner focuses on the claim that “Being is that which determines entities as entities” (SZ: 6, emphasis supplied), Carman is quick to point out that for Heidegger “entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained” (SZ: 183). This ambiguity is partially caused by the fact that Heidegger did not devote any section of Being and Time specifically to the problem of the nature of entities, a lack probably due to his concern for changing the focus of the tradition and completing metaphysics by shifting from the Aristotelian question ti to on to the question of Being (see for example GA 3: 221). The closest candidate, however, is a notoriously difficult passage, “The Concept of Phenomenon” (SZ, §7A), which none of the afore-mentioned interpreters has examined in its entirety.3 The beginning of the passage provides an ontic definition of the “phenomenon” (Phänomen), as “that

3 Blattner comes the closest, but his exegesis stops before the crucially important notion of “mere appearances” is introduced. The reason for this omission is indirectly given in a footnote (1999: 11), which dismisses “mere appearances” as “the somehow products of entities in the world”. Blattner sees this as Heidegger's misreading of “Kant's few remarks about noumenal causation of appearances”; as will become apparent, Heidegger's reading of Kant is correct, it is Blattner’s (quite understandable) assumption that the passage is referring to noumenal causation that is mistaken.
which shows itself in itself, the manifest” (SZ: 28). Thus “the ‘phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light -- what the Greeks sometimes identified simply as \textit{ta onta} (entities)” (ibid.). At this stage, it is impossible to draw any conclusion about the nature of entities and their relation to Being (the definition just indicates that entities are whatever is in the sense of being presenced). The second meaning of the phenomenon, “semblance” (\textit{Schein}), is also an ontic one: it refers to an entity showing itself “as something which it is not”, or “looking like something or other” (ibid.). Heidegger does not give any example, but optical illusions (such as Descartes’ seemingly broken stick) seem to be a plausible option (see SZ: 30). Semblance is structurally dependent on the first signification of the phenomenon in the sense that it presupposes the possibility of something being able to show itself in itself in the first place -- thus one must be able to see that the stick is not broken (when it is removed from the water) to realise that the perception of it as broken is a case of semblance, and not just the phenomenon of a broken stick showing itself as it is in itself. Thus Heidegger concludes that the term “phenomenon” should be reserved for the “positive and primordial signification of \textit{phainomenon}” (SZ: 29), i.e. entities, while semblance is just a privative modification. Again, this does not help much \textit{per se} to clarify the relation of entities to Being, although it has important implications for Heidegger’s understanding of truth (in the sense that without this distinction between the two first meanings of the phenomenon, ontic truth as correspondence would not be possible, for we couldn’t ascertain whether an entity is disclosed in itself or not).

However, the situation changes with the next two definitions, “appearance” (\textit{Erscheinung}) and in particular “mere appearance” (\textit{blosse Erscheinung}). Unexpectedly, because Heidegger introduces them by saying that both phenomenon and semblance have “proximally nothing at all to do with what is called an appearance, or still less a ‘mere appearance’” (SZ: 29). However, as we shall see the way Heidegger analyses them shows that in fact, they have a lot to do with each other, and that this exaggerated warning is mostly motivated by his worry that “the bewildering multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the words ‘phenomenon’, ‘semblance’, ‘appearance’, ‘mere appearance’ cannot be disentangled” (SZ: 31) unless they are carefully distinguished. Heidegger's emphasis that all are “founded upon the phenomenon, although in different ways” (SZ: 31) is \textit{per se} indicative that his warning should not be taken literally. By contrast with the first two cases, in which what is shows itself, respectively as what it is (entities as ontic phenomena) are or as what it is not (semblance), appearing is a “not showing itself” (SZ: 29), specified as “an announcing itself through something that shows itself” (SZ: 29). Appearing is a way for an entity to indicate its presence, but without revealing itself directly, and therefore through the disclosure of another entity -- thus, says Heidegger, measles announces itself through spots. So the spots are, considered in their own right, a phenomenon (they show themselves as what they are); but considered with respect to what is hidden and which they indicate (the disease), they are an appearance. As both what “announces itself” (SZ: 30) (the disease) and what does the announcing (the spots) are entities, this definition of appearance, like that of semblance, is an ontic one: appearance “means a reference-relationship which is \textit{in an entity itself} and which is such that what does the referring . . . can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself and is thus a ‘phenomenon’” (SZ: 31, emphasis supplied). Consequently (as in the case of semblance), the relation between appearances and phenomena is not symmetrical: the possibility of there being appearances in the first place rests on the ontic definition of the phenomenon as that which shows itself in itself (without which the spots couldn’t be disclosed):
thus “phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is dependent on phenomena” (SZ: 30; strictly speaking, Heidegger should say that considered in themselves phenomena are never appearances).

So what is can show itself as what it is (as an entity, a phenomenon in the ontic sense), as what it is not (semblance), or not show itself at all and appear through some other entity that indicates it. However, there is an even more complex mode of disclosure for entities, introduced as a complication of the referring structure of appearance. In the case of “mere appearances”, “that which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself. On the other hand, this not showing which veils is not a semblance” (SZ: 30). According to what we have just seen, appearances and mere appearances are both phenomena in the ontic sense (they “show themselves”); but whereas appearances indicate what announces itself in such a way that its presence can be made indirectly manifest (through the reference structure), the indication performed by mere appearances is such that what announces itself must structurally remain hidden. Both appearances and mere appearances are referred by Heidegger to Kant in the following way: “according to him, appearances are, in the first place, the ‘objects of empirical intuition’ . . . . But what thus shows itself (the ‘phenomenon’ in the genuine primordial sense) is at the same time an appearance as an emanation of something which hides itself in that appearance” (SZ: 30). It is difficult to interpret this passage simply from the perspective of Being and Time, which remains fairly allusive. In particular, the temptation is great to read it, as Blattner does, in the light of Kant's remarks on noumenal causation, and to identify the “something which hides itself” to a thing-in-itself, and ‘mere appearances’ to its manifestation (its “emanation” (Ausstrahlung) in the empirical realm. This, in turn, would suggest that Heidegger holds the so-called “two-world” view, according to which things-in-themselves, as super-sensible beings, are substantially different from phenomena (in the Kantian sense) themselves considered as mental representations which can only obscure the true nature of the in-itself. If such was the case, then the mode of disclosure intrinsic to mere appearances would be hopelessly metaphysical (and without any relevance whatsoever to Heidegger's own position regarding entities) for three reasons: a) mere appearances (and appearances) would not be entities, but subjective representations, b) mere appearances would not refer to entities anymore (contrary to appearances in the Heideggerian sense), but to things-in-themselves, and c) the objects of the reference structure (i.e. the things-in-themselves) would be forever beyond our reach.

However, both the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics are helpful in correcting this view. Heidegger returns twice to the notion of “mere appearances” (which indirectly underlines its importance), and makes it clear that both appearances and mere appearances are entities, not mental representations: “the general discussion of the thing-in-itself and appearances should make clear that appearances mean objects or things themselves. The term mere appearance does not refer to mere subjective products to which nothing actual corresponds. Appearance as appearance or object does not need at all still to correspond to something actual, because appearance itself is the actual” (GA 25: 100). Throughout the two Kant books, Heidegger is very insistent that one should avoid endorsing the two-worlds view of transcendental idealism, which he calls the “grossest misunderstanding”: “appearance is also appearance of something -- as Kant puts it: the thing
itself. However, in order to eliminate right away the grossest misunderstanding, we must say that appearances are not mere illusions, nor are they some kind of free floating emissions from things. Rather appearances are objects themselves, or things. Thus Heidegger's reading of Kant anticipates the so-called “deflationary” or “two-aspects” interpretation of transcendental idealism put forward by Bird and Allison. In doing so, Heidegger opposes stronger interpretations of transcendental idealism, which commit Kant to a substantial definition of the thing-in-itself as an intelligible entity, with specific properties which we can think (but not know) -- for example, immortality for the soul, or free noumenal agency. This clarifies two

4 GA 25: 98. See also GA 25: 55: “when Kant brings out the Copernican revolution in philosophy--when he has the objects hinging on knowledge rather than knowledge hinging on objects--this does not mean that real beings are turned upside down in interpretation and get resolved into mere subjective representations.” Guyer’s (1987) attacks on Allison’s position are a good representative of the kind of mistake that Heidegger has in mind here. Guyer grounds his criticism of the two-aspect view on the Kantian statement that epistemic conditions, particularly space and time, are “merely subjective”, in which case they would be imposed on entities (hence the charge of “impositionalism”) and all we would know would be our own mental representations of things. However, while the claim that space and time are “merely subjective” denies them transcendental applications, it does not mean that they do not have empirical validity, quite on the contrary. This is the reason why Kant can describe himself as a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. Another similar criticism is provided by Langton 2001. Like Guyer, she assumes that when Kant speaks of space as “ideal”, “subjective” or a “mere representation”, he is expressing a kind of phenomenalism (or empirical idealism) about space. But Kant insists on the “objective validity” and “empirical reality” of space (A35-36).

5 Such a position can be broadly characterised by the two following sets of claims: a) transcendental conditions exist, can be analysed a priori and form the framework necessary for things to be constituted as phenomena; b) it makes sense, however, to bracket these transcendental conditions and to refer to the same things thus considered in themselves, as endowed with independent properties which we cannot know, although we are driven by the very nature of human reason to think about them.

6 Heidegger's interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, perhaps because it leaves the Transcendental Dialectics aside completely, is mostly concerned with Kant's account of the conditions of the constitution of phenomena, and very little with the latter’s positive suggestions about the nature of things-in-themselves. Thus Heidegger anticipates more contemporary readings, in particular Graham Bird’s and Henry Allison’s, in trying to establish the meaning of transcendental idealism exclusively from the First Critique. There are some differences between Heidegger's and Allison’s interpretations of Kant, in particular on the question of the nature of self-affection and the status of the “I think” of transcendental apperception; but as none of them are relevant to the question of Heidegger's appropriation of Kant, I won’t develop them here.

7 Such interpretations, such as Karl Ameriks’, argue that it is not desirable to read the Critique of Pure Reason in isolation from other works, in particular the Second Critique and the Groundwork. However this is precisely what Heidegger does, with just a fleeting reference to the notion of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason (as also dependent on the activity of transcendental imagination). Cf. GA 3: §30, “Transcendental Imagination and Practical
points in *Being and Time*: firstly, it explains why the “not showing which veils” of mere appearances is not a semblance. Semblance refers to an entity showing itself for what it is not (a “mere illusion”); mere appearances are entities which show themselves for what they are, but which, in doing so, also indicate something else. Secondly, it suggests that the indication performed is very unlikely to refer to noumenal causality (Heidegger says that is not a “free-floating emission”, a theme that takes up that of “emanation” in *Being and Time*), in particular because of Heidegger's emphasis on the *identity* between the things-in-themselves and appearances: “appearances are also not other things next to or prior to the things themselves. Rather appearances are just those things themselves, which we encounter and discover as occurring within the world” (GA 25: 98; see also GA 3: 32). In fact, Heidegger endorses the two-aspect view to such an extent that his commentary of the *First Critique* leaves entirely out the notion of noumenal causality.

So both appearances and mere appearances are entities; however, the nature of what is indicated by the latter still remains obscure. From Heidegger's strong rejection of the two-world view, we can infer that it is not the thing-in-itself as an intelligible entity. We also know that the indication is not arbitrary (not “free-floating”), and that what is indicated must, at least *prima facie*, remain hidden by the showing itself of the entity. Again, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* provides an important clue: “the ‘mere’ in the phrase ‘mere appearance’ is not a restricting and diminishing of the actuality of the thing, but is rather only the negation of the assumption that the entity can be infinitely known in human knowledge” (GA 3: 34). The “mere” is thus an indication of human finitude, by opposition to the infinite knowledge of an *intuitus originarius*, which would not need external input and could produce the thing it knows in the purely intuitive act of knowing it. But what makes us finite, for Heidegger, is the need for sensory data and for the synthetising activity of thought, which, in turn, both involve *a priori* conditions (in Kant, time and space as the *a priori* forms of sensibility and the pure concepts of the understanding). Consequently, it makes sense to think that “mere appearances” do not refer to another entity, nor to a thing-in-itself, but to the transcendental framework that all entities, as spatio-temporal (or temporal only), must conform to if they are to count for us as entities. Very importantly, this is an *ontological* form of indication: entities, as mere appearances, *structurally* refer to the transcendental conditions of their disclosure. Conversely, these are built into them in such a way that to be an entity in the sense of a mere appearance is tantamount to being a (spatio)-temporal object: since both the *a priori* forms of sensibility (time and space) and the categories (such as causality) are transcendentially involved in the determination of entities, it belongs to the very nature of these entities to be spatio-temporal, and to interact causally: Thus, “appearances as appearances, as beings so encountered, are themselves spatial and intra temporal. *Spatial and temporal determinations belong to that which the encountered being is*” (GA 25: 156, emphasis supplied). *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* extends this point to the pure concepts of the understanding: these “by means of the pure power of imagination, refer essentially to time . . . . For this reason they are, in advance, *determinations of the objects, i.e. of the entity insofar as it is encountered by a finite creature*” (GA 3: 86, emphasis supplied). Very importantly, another passage generalises this inbuilt reference of entities to their transcendental conditions to *all* appearances: “the expression ‘mere appearances’ indicates the beings which are accessible to a finite being. This is the primary meaning of the Kantian concept of appearance”

Reason”.
(GA 25: 100-1, emphasis supplied; the following page indicates that such appearances are
“things encountered in daily life”, in “prescientific experiential knowledge”). So for Kant, all
appearances (i.e. all entities) are mere appearances in that they both obey and indicate the
transcendental conditions under which they must be disclosed.

This, in turn, allows Heidegger to uncover in Kant's work a second, ontological meaning for the
notion of “phenomenon”, distinct from the first ontic sense examined above (that which shows
itself in itself, i.e. entities). He begins by pointing out that there are two ways of thinking of the
phenomenon, both derived from its original definition as “that which shows itself”: the first one
is the “formal” or “ordinary” conception, which we arrive at if “by ‘that which shows itself’” we
understand those entities which are accessible through ‘empirical intuition’ in . . . Kant's sense”
(SZ: 31). This definition refers to mere appearances, and more generally to appearances in the
Kantian (but not Heideggerian) sense. However, with the right method of investigation a second
meaning for the phenomenon can emerge from the first: “we may say that which already shows
itself in the appearance as prior to the “phenomenon” as ordinarily understood and as
accompanying it in every case, even it thus shows itself unthematically, can be brought
thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the forms of intuition) will be the
phenomena of phenomenology” (SZ: 31, emphasis supplied). As we have seen, all appearances
structurally involve (“in every case”) a reference to the spatio-temporal framework which is built
into them as the entities we can have access to. This framework (the “forms of intuition”) is
“prior” to phenomena in the ontic sense because it is presupposed by them as a condition of
possibility for their disclosure: it is thus an ontological kind of phenomenon. But contrary to
these entities, it does not show itself directly (which is the reason why Heidegger said earlier of
mere appearances that what they indicate “hides itself in that appearance”), and it is not itself an
entity. However, it is not irretrievable: “manifestly space and time must be able to show
themselves in this way as the phenomena of phenomenology – they must be able to become
phenomena -- if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when
he says that space is the a priori “inside-which” of an ordering” (SZ: 31). So while phenomena
of the first order (entities) are directly accessible to us, and do not require any elaboration to be
understood, the phenomena of phenomenology, i.e. the transcendental conditions of the
disclosure of entities, can only become a phenomenon in the first sense (i.e. show themselves as
they are) if uncovered by a specific method, phenomenology. Correlatively, the latter must,
because of the nature of its object, be defined as a transcendental form of inquiry which traces
entities to their ontological conditions of possibility: in doing so, phenomenology discloses the
way(s) in which ontic phenomena are constituted. It is very important, however, to understand
such a constitution as transcendental and to distinguish it carefully from any causal process: both
Heidegger and Kant are very clear that we do not create the entities which we access (this would
only be the case if we were infinite beings); nor are the properties disclosed arbitrarily attributed
to them. In fact, neither the mode of disclosure nor the properties are up to us, since we do not
choose our framework, and we do not decide whether what is can or cannot be determined by it,
a point to which I’ll get back to in conclusion.

A careful reading of §7 thus uncovers two meanings, both for appearances and for the
phenomenon. At the ontic level, phenomena are entities, and appearances are entities that refer
to other entities, which appear through them (like measles does through spots). At the
ontological level, all appearances should be seen as “mere appearances” in that they refer to the
transcendental conditions that a finite entity like Dasein needs to be able to access anything. Correlatively, the phenomenon in the ontological sense is identified with these conditions, which are hidden by the entities themselves and can only become accessible to the phenomenologist. This means that while all entities are phenomena (in the first sense) and structurally involve the phenomenon (in the ontological sense), not all phenomena are entities (since the transcendental framework is not ontic). Phenomenality is a condition of possibility for entityhood, but not the reverse, which is the reason why (as Blattner insists) phenomenology is not a primarily a theory of perception. However, so far the ontological meaning of appearances and phenomenon has been established only within the context of Kant's work. What I want to suggest now is that while appearances in the Heideggerian sense are a very limited case of ontic reference (partially taken up in the later analysis of the kind of indication performed by signs and symbols, SZ: 77-83), mere appearances analogically provide us with a way to understand how Heidegger, and not only Kant, thinks of entities as structurally involving a reference to Being as both their condition of intelligibility and thus of existence as entities. I’ll try to establish this point before outlining the limits of the analogy and its consequences on the debate about realism.

In my view, the key to the analogy is given by the final section of §7, i.e. “The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology”, where Heidegger expresses his own views about the nature of phenomena and entities. Just as in his analysis of Kant, he starts with the ontic meaning of the phenomenon: “the expression ‘phenomenology’ may be formulated in Greek as legein ta phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai. Thus ‘phenomenology’ means apophainesthai ta phainomena” (SZ: 34). Because it deals with phenomena in the formal sense (i.e., as entities, cf supra), Heidegger calls this the “formal” meaning of phenomenology, which he sees encapsulated in the Husserlian formula “back to the things themselves!” (i.e. back to entities, as opposed to things-in-themselves). Thus, “the signification of ‘phenomenon’, as conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called ‘phenomenology’ with formal justification” (SZ: 35). However, such a conception, both of phenomenology and of the phenomenon, must be “deformalised”, hence the question: “what is it that must be called a ‘phenomenon’ in a distinctive sense?” (SZ: 35). Heidegger's answer is that “that which remains hidden in an egregious sense . . . is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities” (SZ: 35). Thus “in the phenomenological i.e. ontological conception of the phenomenon what one has in mind as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and its derivatives” (SZ: 35). However, the crucial point here is that this definition of the phenomenological understanding of the phenomenon is, structurally at least, strikingly identical to the ontological definition of the phenomenon in Heidegger's reading of Kant. Indeed, Heidegger indicates that “manifestly, Being is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself; and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground” (SZ: 35, emphasis supplied). Just as time and space, the transcendental forms of intuition, “hide” in Kantian appearances, Being, the phenomenon of phenomenology “lies hidden” within entities (i.e. “that which shows itself”, the ontic definition of the phenomenon). At this point, Heidegger even mentions explicitly (and rejects) vis-B-vis Being the possibility which he previously refuted in the case of mere appearances, i.e. the idea that “the Being of entities could ever be anything such that “behind it” stands something else ‘which does not appear”’ (SZ: 36),
i.e. a thing-in-itself. On the contrary, both the Kantian forms of intuition and Being “belong to what thus shows itself”, not as a property, but as what “constitutes its meaning and its ground”, i.e. as what allows what is to be determined as intelligible (for Heidegger) or cognisable (for Kant), and therefore as an entity (or as a phenomenon in the Kantian sense). In both cases, such a transcendental form of constitution is seen as necessary: thus the phenomenon of phenomenology is something which “by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly i.e. when we shift from the ordinary mode of disclosure to the phenomenological one” (SZ: 35).

The correlate of this is that the conditions of transcendental determination must be reflected, in a way that can be transcendentially clarified, by the ontological structure of entities: as we have seen, according to Kant one can analytically infer from the fact that time and space are a priori forms of sensibility that phenomena are spatio-temporal. In §7, the fact that Being is bound-up with the structure of entities as ontic phenomena (it “lies hidden” within them) is suggested by the claim that it is necessary to start from the entities themselves in order to exhibit the phenomenon in the ontological sense as what is, in each case, their being: “while phenomena in the ontological sense, as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of some entity, we must first bring forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare” (SZ: 37, emphasis supplied). Later in the text, Heidegger makes a similar point about the relation of world (understood ontologically) to entities: “what can be meant by describing the ‘world’ as a phenomenon? It means to let us see what shows itself in “entities” within the world” (SZ: 63; note Heidegger’s use of scare quotes). Conversely, “entities must likewise show themselves with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them” (SZ: 37, emphasis supplied). For such a “belonging” to be “genuine”, or for the being of each entity to be “its” being, access must be impossible to dissociate from the very concept of the entity considered. In turn, this suggests that there is an internal relationship between entities and being, which makes it impossible to separate their what-being as entities from the how of their disclosure. This relationship is the transcendental determination performed by Dasein. In the final part of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, where he defines his enterprise as a “retrieval” (GA 3: 208) of the Kantian project, Heidegger strongly reasserts that ontological determination must be understood in its intrinsic connection with the nature of entities as entities, and gives some indications as to its nature: in the question as to what the entity as such might be, we have asked what generally determines the entity as an entity. We call it the Being of the entity . . . . This determining should be known in the How of its determining . . . . In order to be able to grasp the essential determinacy of the entity through Being, however, the determining itself must be sufficiently comprehensible (GA 3: 222-3, emphasis supplied; see also GA 3: 283, where Heidegger speaks of the “transcendence of man” as a “formative comporting towards entities,” emphasis supplied).

A few pages later, Heidegger specifies how this “determining” should be seen by stating that the existential analytic of everydayness . . . should show that and how all association with entities, even where it appears as if there were just entities i.e. even where entities seem to be independent from our “association” with (or, in terms used so far, access to) them, already presupposes the transcendence of Dasein -- namely, being-in-the-world. With it, the projection of the Being of the entity, although concealed and for the most part indeterminate, takes place” (GA 3: 235, some emphasis supplied).
This allows us to understand better the kind of transcendental determination that is specific both to Dasein and to entities. Indeed, for Heidegger, the idea of a “projection” of Being as the horizon of ontological determination is an analogical transposition of the opening of the pure horizon of temporality by the schematising activity of transcendental imagination in Kant’s work. In the same way, temporality is understood by Heidegger himself as the “transcendental primal structure” that underlies both care and being-in-the-world (GA 3: 242; Blattner has shown that this is already the case in Being and Time). As we shall see below, this means that, as suggested by Blattner, all entities are a priori determined as temporal.

There are, of course, limits to the analogy between Kant and Heidegger, most of which were identified by Heidegger himself. Firstly, in focusing the search for the conditions of ontological determinability on the transcendental subject as a detached, disembodied ego, Kant chose the wrong starting point. He remained trapped within the Cartesian understanding of the subject as a thinking substance, which led him to think of Dasein as a worldless entity, an occurrent compound of body and soul (GA 25: 160-1). This is why Kant was able to provide, at best, a regional ontology of the occurrent (because he failed to replace theoretical cognition within the wider context of understanding as grounded in our everyday practices)(see for example GA 25: 199). Thus, the fundamental and crucial deficiency in Kant's posing of the problem of the categories in general lies in misconstruing the problem of transcendence -- or better said, in failing to see transcendence as an original and essential determination of the ontological constitution of Dasein. Insofar as it factually exists, Dasein is precisely not an isolated subject, but a being which is fundamentally outside of itself (GA 25: 315).

This failure to understand the ecstatic nature of Dasein as being-in-the-world explains Kant's second shortcoming, i.e. his shrinking back from his own insight into the temporally projective nature of transcendental imagination as the “common root” between the pure forms of sensibility (time and space) and the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories). According to Heidegger, in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant did recognise the properly synthetic role played by transcendental imagination, and established that both the a priori forms of sensibility and the “I think” of transcendental apperception are dependent on its syntheses: thus, “the origin of pure intuition and pure thinking as transcendental faculties is shown to be based on the transcendental power of imagination” (GA 3: 138). Consequently, Kant defined time as pure self-affection, and spelled out the connection between the three imaginative syntheses (apprehension, reproduction and recognition) and the three dimensions of temporality (respectively, present, past and future) (see GA 25: §20-24. On time as self-affection, see GA 25: 386-99; on the three syntheses, 403-24). But although he glimpsed the horizontal nature of temporality and thus came close to uncovering the constitutive link between time and being, Kant “shrank back” from his own intuition, and demoted imagination to being a purely empirical faculty in the B edition.8 Thus he “looked on imagination as the dimension of human Dasein . . . only to be scared away from it” (GA 25: 279). However, it is crucial to note that these limitations do not affect the reading of Heidegger that I have suggested. Heidegger does not criticise Kant for claiming that entities are transcendentally determined (as spatio-temporal): on

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8Heidegger thinks that part of the reason for this lies in Kant's remaining influenced by the scholastic division of the faculties, and the need to reinforce the traditional prevalence of the understanding over both sensibility and imagination.
the contrary, he blames him for not developing the idea of transcendental determination far enough, and in particular for not having seen (or rather having “shrunk back” from the idea) that temporality is not only an a priori form of sensibility, but also underlies the “I think” of transcendental apperception and the syntheses of transcendental imagination. Heidegger does not question the claim that entities get their “essential determinacy” through being, and thus that they must not be dissociated from the transcendental framework that determines them. On the contrary, he establishes that temporality underlies that framework at all levels, not only as far as occurrence is concerned. The consequence of this is that although no empirical property can be ascribed in advance to entities, all entities are a priori determined by Dasein as temporal. Just as, on Heidegger's dual-aspect reading of Kant, we can analytically infer, from the fact that time and space are a priori forms of sensibility, that phenomena are spatio-temporal, in the same way we can infer from the fact that temporality underlies the structure of being-in-the-world and of care that entities are temporal (although one cannot infer any such thing about what is independently of the conditions of transcendental determination).

This has important consequences, however, on the existing debate about Heidegger's realism. On the one hand, some commentators, like Dreyfus, hold that “Heidegger never concluded from the fact that our practices are necessary for access to theoretical entities that these entities must be defined in terms of our access practices” (Dreyfus 1991: 253). This position was recently radicalised by Carman, who reads Heidegger as an “ontic realist”, ontic realism being “the claim that occurrent entities exist and have a determinate spatio-temporal structure independently of us and our understanding of them” (2003: 157). Both these options associate two positions: ontological realism (there is a way entities are in themselves) and epistemological realism (we can know them as they are in themselves). On the other hand others, like Blattner, think that Heidegger is a transcendental (or temporal) idealist, do so on the opposite assumption that entities (like phenomena for Kant) cannot be defined as such independently of the conditions of their disclosure: thus, “Being determines entities by making up the criterial standards to which entities (or aspects of what is) must conform in order to be entities at all. Being is a framework of items without which entities would not be entities” (Blattner 1999: 5, emphasis supplied). On the strength of this strong definition of transcendental determination, Blattner attributes to Heidegger a position broadly similar to Kant's, namely a combination of transcendental idealism and ontic realism, where ontic realism has a very different meaning from the one suggested by Carman as it combines a limited form of epistemological realism (we can know phenomena/entities as they are at the empirical level/from Dasein’s perspective) with the idealist epistemic claim that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, i.e. from the transcendental (in the strong sense) standpoint.

9 Similar but not identical, because Blattner thinks that Kant is an ontic idealist (Blattner 1999: 245, footnote 25). Much as I sympathise with Blattner's views in general, I disagree on this particular point, which is also strongly denied by Heidegger’s own reading of Kant.

10 Hence Blattner analysis of SZ: 212, and his rejection of what he calls the “weak” interpretation of the passage, according to which the contrast between “now” and “then” should be seen as merely ontic, opposing two empirical possibilities (Dasein’s existence versus a time when there would have been no Dasein).
Both the Kant books and *Being and Time*, §7 suggest that Blattner is right. In particular, the idea that entities get their “essential determinacy” through being, and this, *a priori*, tends to invalidate the claim, put forward by Carman, that “although Heidegger maintains that cognition is founded on being in, and that occurrent reality is interpretable for us only against the horizon of our own worldliness . . ., occurrent entities themselves nevertheless do not depend on being-in-the-world” (Carman 2003: 134). The main argument offered is that if such was not the case, then Dasein’s naïve realism would be unjustified. But as we have seen, entities depend on being-in-the-world, not in the sense that they are created by Dasein, or that Dasein attributes to them arbitrary properties, but because they are *a priori* determined as temporal entities. This does not mean that what is *as such* depends on being-in-the-world (otherwise Heidegger would be committed to a form of subjective idealism), but that so long as it is determined by our framework of intelligibility and is disclosed as entities, the nature of these entities is bound-up with their mode of disclosure. Therefore the claim that “Heidegger takes occurrent entities to exist and have a determinate causal structure independently of the conditions of our interpreting or making sense of them” (Carman 2003: 159) is inconsistent: occurrent entities can only be occurrent if they are ontologically determined as entities by Dasein. Similarly, their having a causal structure is due to the fact that causality is, as Carman puts it himself (in rather Kantian terms), an “ontological category”, an “*a priori* category of the understanding, the content of which is precisely the content of Dasein’s naïve realism about objects as existing independently of us and our understanding” (Carman 2003: 136). In his (legitimate) concern to avoid subjective idealism, Carman commits Heidegger to a form of pre-critical realism (equally suggested by his claim that “contrary to Kant’s prohibition, there is no good reason to deny that we can do have knowledge of things as they are in themselves,” Carman 2003: 159). This is not to say that Heidegger is not a realist -- he is, but not of the kind suggested by Carman. He is an ontic realist in the *critical*, Kantian sense suggested (but not fully developed) by Blattner: he does think that we can know entities as they are, but not independently of their mode of access. Whether it is possible for us to know more than this is the question that I now shall turn to.

To answer it, we need to ascertain the extent to which Heidegger is committed to the theoretical correlate of transcendental determination, i.e. the Kantian idea that one must distinguish between phenomena and things-in-themselves, and that the latter are unknowable. This, in turn, involves finding out exactly how much of transcendental idealism Heidegger endorses and, in particular, whether and how the idea of a transcendental standpoint makes sense in the context of his work. In answer to this question, I shall try to establish two sets of claims: firstly, that *per se*, Heidegger’s commitment to the notion of transcendental determination does entail two theses that are central to the deflationary interpretation of transcendental idealism outlined above: a)

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11 It should become clear in the course of this paper that the version of realism I suggest also supports Dasein’s “ naïve realism”. It is also perhaps worth noting that one of the reasons for Carman’s rejection of the strong notion of transcendental determination, which results in his endorsement of a pre-critical notion of realism, is that his reading of Kant inclines towards the two-world view that Heidegger himself rejected. Thus, “Kant often sounds like a realist in another sense, of course, inasmuch as he seems to regard things-in-themselves as constituents of some kind of ultimate reality that exists independently of human cognition, notwithstanding the fact that “reality” and “existence” are themselves mere categories of the understanding which is tantamount to accusing Kant of being a metaphysical realist ” (Carman 2003: 156).
that there must also be a way in which things are in themselves, independently of us and of the kind of determination we perform, and thus that it makes sense to speak of the transcendental standpoint in the strong sense, and b) that such things are not substantially different from the entities which are accessible to us, but are the same things, considered under different aspects. I will suggest that Heidegger's name for things considered in this way is the “Real” (das Reale).

Secondly, that this position commits Heidegger neither to the notion of a thing-in-itself in the strong sense (which he explicitly rejects, cf. GA 25: 98-99), nor, more polemically, to the idea that we cannot know what is (although we cannot know it as it is, i.e. from a God’s eye perspective). While the first is consistent with the deflationary reading of transcendental idealism, the second is not, as Allison, following Kant, insists on the non-spatiality and non-temporality of things-in-themselves, a point I shall discuss later on with reference to Heidegger.

The first two theses have already been touched upon in the course of this paper. They are explicitly stated by Heidegger with reference to Kant, as both the Kant books aim at establishing that the difference between an appearance and a thing-in-itself, although real, is not a difference in kind, but one of perspective. Thus, “the entity ‘in the appearance’ is the same entity as the entity in itself, and this alone” (GA 3: 31). But while all appearances are by definition cognisable by us,

what remains closed off to us is the thing itself insofar as it is thought as object of an absolute knowledge, i.e. as object of an intuition which does not first need the interaction with the thing and does not first let the thing be encountered, but rather lets the thing first of all become what the thing is through this intuition (GA 25: 98).

To understand the difference between phenomena and things-in-themselves, then, one must differenciate between two modes of cognition, not two sorts of entities: on the one hand, “divine knowing” as a “representing which, in intuiting, first creates the intuitable being as such,” and therefore does not bear “the mark of finitude” (GA 3: 24) as it is bounded neither by a pre-existing thing nor by the need to access it through sensibility and thought. On the other hand, “finite knowledge”, which perforce must “let the thing be encountered”, i.e. received through the a priori forms of sensibility and synthesised through the activity of imagination and judgment. Thus, the thrust of Heidegger's argument about Kant is that “a discussion of the difference between finite and infinite knowledge with a view to the difference in character between what is known in each respectively now points out that these concepts of appearance and thing-in-itself, which are fundamental for the Critique, can only be made understandable and part of the wider problem by basing them more explicitly on the problematic of the finitude of the human creature” (GA 3: 35, emphasis supplied).

This, however, has a crucially important consequence: although Heidegger and Kant do not understand finitude in the same way (for the reasons mentioned above), they both agree on the idea that the defining feature of Dasein (or human beings, for Kant) is their finitude: the main difference is that whereas for Kant the hallmark of finitude is the need for the conjoined operations of sensibility and thought, for Heidegger it is Dasein’s “transcendental neediness” for an understanding of Being (GA 3: 236), and the fact that this understanding is constitutively covered up in forgetfulness (GA 3: 233, see also 234). It follows that Heidegger's very grounding of the distinction between things as they are and things as they are disclosed to us in the notion of finitude requires him, analytically, to extend the distinction to his own position:

in truth, however, the essence of finitude inevitably forces us to the question concerning
the conditions of the possibility of a preliminary Being-oriented toward the Object, i.e., concerning the essence of the necessary ontological turning-toward the object in general (GA 3: 73), i.e., in Heidegger's thought, to a consideration of temporality as underlying care as the “transcendental unity of finitude” (GA 3: 237). As finite beings, we cannot be in the world unless we transcendentially determine entities as temporal. However, there is no reason to think that such a determination is the only possible one, nor that it would apply to what is if our transcendental conditions were bracketed. Correlatively, we are required to accept that transcendental determination is also dependent on external conditions:

we can say negatively: finite knowledge is non creative intuition. What has to be presented immediately in its particularity must already have been “at hand” in advance. Finite intuition sees that it is dependent on the intuitable as something which exists in its own right (GA 3: 25).

Another passage states that finite knowledge is “confronted” with and is a “conforming” (GA 3: 31) to what is already there. The notion of “conformity” is a very important one as it prevents Heidegger's position from turning into subjective idealism. What is must conform to the conditions of transcendental determination to be disclosed as entities; but conversely, such conformity is not something that can be determined solely by these conditions. It is very important to note, however, that this does not mean that transcendental determination works (either in Kant or in Heidegger), by imposing form on some pre-existing matter. Because we are thrown, entities are always already determined by us, there is no pure matter to which we could first relate and then shape (this is the background of Kant’s rejection of atomism, and of Heidegger’s refutation of skepticism about the existence of the external world).

However, there is an important difference between Heidegger and Kant here: although both are committed by their insistence on the finitude of Dasein to the distinction between the two standpoints, empirical and transcendental, it does not follow that they must have the same understanding of the transcendental standpoint (and consequently, of the nature of things considered in themselves). The reason why they differ is that contrary to Kant, Heidegger does not believe in the existence of God nor, consequently, in the possibility of infinite knowledge: thus,

along with the assumption of an absolute intuition, which first produces things . . . , the concept of a thing-in-itself also dies away. . . . One denies the philosophical legitimacy and usefulness of such an assumption, which not only does not contribute to our enlightenment but also confuses us, as it becomes clear in Kant (GA 25: 99-100).

This means that the transcendental standpoint cannot be identified anymore with the perspective of a “representing God” (GA 25: 99), for whom the cognition and the creation of things would be one and single operation. However, what it does not mean is that one should drop the notion of a transcendental standpoint altogether. For one thing, we have seen that Heidegger's analysis of finitude suggests that it is analytically entailed by the notion of ontological determination. Moreover, the relevance of the transcendental standpoint to Heidegger’s own thought has been established by Blattner’s analysis of Being and Time (SZ: 211-12; see Blattner 1999: 240-51), which shows that it should not be seen as the perspective of a “deus faber” (GA 25: 99), but as the bracketing of the conditions under which transcendental determination operate (namely, Dasein’s projective understanding of time). In response to Cerbone’s objection, this bracketing does not need to be thought of as an existential possibility for Dasein: this would be tantamount
to requiring that Dasein should be able to occupy the transcendental standpoint, which is excluded by definition (since that standpoint only obtains when Dasein’s perspective does not apply) (see CERBONE). The bracketing of transcendental conditions can only be a logical possibility, analytically entailed by the notion of transcendental determination itself. However, even as such, it is not without any value (in answer to Carman’s comment that Heidegger would be “pointing out the vacuity and futility of all efforts to stake out a distinct transcendental standpoint,” see Carman 2003: 171). Although it cannot fulfil any positive epistemological function (as it prevents by definition the formation of any synthetic knowledge), such a bracketing has an important ethical role to play: it can counterbalance what Heidegger calls our tendency to be “constantly under the domination of an absolutisation of our finitude” (GA 25: 159), i.e. to fall into the trap of metaphysical realism and to believe that our knowledge is, not only of entities, but also of things considered in themselves -- this has important consequences, to which I shall come back in conclusion.

The claim that the transcendental standpoint should be defined, not as that of a divine intellect but as a bracketing of transcendental (in the weak sense) conditions is precisely the position defended by Henry Allison. Thus, “the task of a transcendental justification of the concept of the thing-in-itself . . . is to explain the possibility and significance of considering “as they are in themselves” the same objects which can know only as they appear; it is not, at is frequently assumed, to license appeal to a set of unknown entities distinct from appearances” (Allison 1983: 239). According to him, this entails the important consequence that things-in-themselves should not be thought of substantively, as intelligible entities, but problematically, as the “logical correlates of a non sensible manner of cognition” (Allison 1983: 242). Thus Allison argues for the identification of the thing-in-itself with the transcendental object (suggested by Kant himself in A366), as the “correlate of the unity of apperception” (A250), or “something in general = X” (A346/B449), i.e. an object considered apart from the sensible conditions under which things can be intuited by the human mind. Another passage from Kant explains why the notion is important, and further identifies the transcendental object with the noumenon understood in its negative sense: “in the process of warning sensibility that it must not presume to claim applicability to thing-in-itself but only to appearances, the understanding does indeed think for itself an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object . . . , which can be thought neither as quantity nor as reality nor a substance, etc . . . If we are pleased to name this object ‘noumenon’ for the reason that its representation is not sensible, we are free to do so” (A288-89/B344-45). Very interestingly, Heidegger too refers to the transcendental object in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, in order to distinguish it from the substantive concept of the thing-in-itself. He returns to the question of the usefuleness of the concept of a thing-in-itself and indicates that it “cannot be set aside by solving it epistemologically, but that this concept . . . can only be removed if one can show that the presupposition of an absolute understanding is not philosophically necessary” (GA 26: 164). The reason why such a removal cannot be “epistemologically” justified is that there is no contradiction in thinking of what is either as determined by transcendental conditions, or independently of such conditions. As we have seen, the denial of the thing-in-itself as the correlate of divine cognition is tied to Heidegger's rejection

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12 This is the basis of Allison’s “semantic reading” of Kant, which argues that there is a logical implication between the consideration of something as an appearance and the possibility of considering the same thing in itself.
of Kant's implicit theology. However, he also points out that such a rejection does not have any consequence on the possibility of thinking what is from the transcendental standpoint (as a bracketing of epistemic conditions): “proceeding from appearance, one can show the “X” immanent in it qua thing-in-itself, which is not, however, the “thing-in-itself” in the strict sense i.e. as the correlate of divine understanding” (GA 26: 164). Thus although the positive concept of a thing-in-itself requires additional theological assumptions, that of the transcendental object does not: it is analytically entailed by the notion of appearance as the object of finite cognition.

Allison’s interpretation has come under much criticism, in particular from K. Ameriks and R. Pippin (see Pippin 1982: 200 ff.), who attacked it on the grounds that it dilutes the meaning of transcendental idealism to such an extent that the concept would apply to any alternative to transcendental realism which endorses an equivalent to transcendental determination (in particular, constructivist views of language). However, although this is a worry for an interpretation of Kant, it is not so for the kind of reading of Heidegger I suggest, since I never claimed that Heidegger endorses Kantian transcendental idealism as such, only that his position is most of the time (but not always) analogous to it. Indeed, I now would like to turn to my second hypothesis, namely the idea that Being and Time involves an analogon of the noumenon as a negative concept, although there is nothing in it that could be read as a thing-in-itself in the strong sense. Heidegger introduces the “Real” by contrasting it with “reality” (Realität). He indicates that “the term “Reality” is meant to stand for the Being of entities present-at-hand within the world (res)” (SZ: 209; see also SZ: 183): reality is thus the mode of being of occurrent entities. However, Heidegger adds that “entities within-the-world are ontologically conceivable only if the phenomenon of within-the-worldness has been clarified” (SZ: 209). This, in turn, requires an analysis of being-in-the-world and ultimately of care as the “structural totality of Dasein’s being” (SZ: 209) -- another passage indicates that “in the order of the ways in which things are connected in their ontological foundations . . . , reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care” (SZ: 211). As we have seen, this means that all entities are transcendently determined as temporal. Heidegger thus concludes that he has “marked out the foundations and horizons which must be clarified if an analysis of reality is to be possible” and, importantly, that “only in this connection, moreover, does the character of the “in itself” become ontologically intelligible” (SZ: 209, emphasis supplied). This idea is clarified two pages later by the following claim: “but the fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself is” (SZ: 212). This suggests that while reality, as a mode of being, is dependent on care and thus on transcendental determination, the Real refers to what is “in-itself”, i.e. independently of care, which confers on it a position analogical to that of the noumenon, as “a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition” (B307). Following on the analogy with the two aspects view examined so far, one would expect Heidegger to say that the real is not substantially different from entities, but that it is determined as entities by Dasein. As it happens, this is exactly what Heidegger says: “the Real is essentially accessible only as entities

13 Ameriks points out the “substantive character of things-in-themselves with non spatio-temporal characteristics”. Allison’s response to him (1996: 20) is that the intelligible objects referred to by Kant are the ideas of pure reason, not things-in-themselves. While the notion is central to the “Transcendental Dialectics”, this metaphysical account should not be used within the context of the “Analytic of Principles”.
within-the-world which does suggest that the Real, considered in itself, i.e. independently of transcendental conditions is not entities. All access to such entities is founded ontologically upon the basic state of Dasein, being-in-the-world; and this in turn has care as its even more primordial state of Being” (SZ: 202, emphasis supplied).

Heidegger differs from Kant in that he distinguishes several ways in which the Real can be accessed, and thus asks a question which Kant himself could not have asked: “and finally we must make sure what kind of primary access we have to the Real, by deciding the question of whether knowing can take over this function at all as opposed to more primordial non theoretical, practically engaged forms of understanding” (SZ: 202). But just like Kant, Heidegger rejects the claim that the Real could be known in itself, independently of its ontological determination into entities. This is made clear by his refutation of Dilthey’s position, which follows his analysis of reality: “to be sure, the Reality of the Real can be characterised phenomenologically within certain limits without an explicit existential-ontological basis. This is what Dilthey attempted in the article mentioned above. He holds that the Real gets experienced in impulse and will, and that Reality is resistance, or, more exactly, the character of resisting. He then works out the phenomenon of resistance analytically” (SZ: 209). The example of resistance is interesting because it was already used by Schopenhauer with the same aim in mind, namely to try to identify positively the thing-in-itself as will (an identification that both Kant and Heidegger reject). Against this possibility, Heidegger argues that it is impossible to attribute the property of resisting to the Real as such, since resistance can only be experienced on the background of the disclosure of the world, which by definition precludes it from applying to the Real. Thus “the experiencing of resistance . . . is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world. The character of resisting is one that belongs to entities within-the-world” (SZ: 210, emphasis supplied). Therefore the Real cannot be defined as what resists but only negatively, as the correlate of the transcendental standpoint in the strong sense (i.e. the bracketing of our understanding of Being).

I hope that I have now clarified the extent to which early Heidegger appropriates Kant's thought in both the Kant books and in Being and Time, §7. The analysis of the ontological reference structurally performed by “mere appearances”, and of the way in which Heidegger extends it to his own thought, show that any pre-critical form of epistemological realism (i.e.: things could be known as they are independently of our mode of access to them) must be rejected, although a critical form of realism (we can know all entities as they are, but what they are as entities cannot be dissociated from the transcendental perspective which is the only one possible for us) is perfectly acceptable. Heidegger “retrieves” Kant's project by showing that entities are

14 There are some passages, in particular in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, which resist this interpretation and tend to support a more naïve view of realism by suggesting that entities are what they are independently of whether we access them or not. See for example GA 26: 194-5, where Heidegger asserts that “beings are in themselves the kinds of beings they are, and in the way they are, even if, for example, Dasein does not exist”. However, Heidegger continues in the following way: “only insofar as existing Dasein gives itself anything like being can beings emerge in their in-themselves, i.e., can the first claim likewise be understood at all and be taken into account.” This suggests to me that the first claim (“beings are in themselves the kinds of beings they are”) is implicitly made from the empirical standpoint, from which indeed what neither beings’ existence nor what they are is dependent on Dasein. However, the seemingly
ontologically determined as temporal by Dasein, and therefore cannot be considered as such independently from it. As we have seen, it does not follow from this that Heidegger is a subjective idealist (and neither is Kant). Moreover, the dual claims that the need for ontological determination is definitive of Dasein’s finitude, and that the latter is inescapable, entail that although for us there is nothing but entities, we are not entitled to universalise the kind of transcendental determination we perform and think that it is the only possible one. Therefore, the possibility of bracketing our transcendental conditions and of referring to what is in itself (the Real) must be allowed, although such a reference must remain purely negative, and such a bracketing cannot by definition be performed by Dasein itself. Yet its logical possibility is essential to prevent the “absolutisation” of our finitude. For Kant, such an absolutisation is due to reason’s forgetfulness of its limitations (the need for sensory input) and thus to its driving “desire” (A796/B824) to overstep the boundaries of experience (which generates the illusions analysed in the “Transcendental Dialectics”). In my view, there is an analogical element in Heidegger’s thought, which is falling (Verfallen): as a “primal metaphysical factum in Dasein” (GA 3: 233), falling is a structural feature of Dasein, and cannot be avoided. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* defines it as our inescapable tendency to forget that we need (and have) an understanding of Being, a forgetfulness which is “nothing accidental or temporary, but on the contrary is necessarily and constantly formed”\(^{15}\). Such a forgetfulness is tantamount to forgetting the existence of ontological determination, which in turn can lead to pre-critical realism: entities are seen as what is in itself. Conversely, the task of fundamental ontology is to “wrest the forgetfulness away from what is apprehended in the projection of our understanding of Being” (GA 3: 233). In this context, to insist on the independence and unknowability of the Real *as such* is essential to prevent the illusion arising that the way in which Dasein must disclose the Real is the way in which the Real is *per se*, and therefore the anthropocentric claim that Dasein’s perspective on what is should be the only one\(^{16}\).

\(^{15}\) GA 3: 233. In *Being and Time*, falling refers to the movement by which Dasein seeks to hide from its ontological lack of essence by covering it up with ontical identities and roles. However the two definitions are not inconsistent. Dasein can only identify fully with a role provided by the “One” if it remains unaware of the fact that such a role is merely an existential possibility among others. This entails a misconception of itself as a being endowed with a nature (understood as a fixed set of essential properties), which, in turn, is only possible if Dasein forgets that its real essence lies in the lack of such a nature, and thus in its having a projective understanding of Being.

\(^{16}\) I do not have enough space to develop this second point further, but it is particularly important in the light of the development of Heidegger’s thought after *Being and Time*, which is more and more concerned with the danger of anthropocentrism. Thus, Heidegger's well-known reversal, in the *Letter on Humanism*, of the relation between Dasein and Being (Dasein is characterised as the “shepherd” of Being instead of being the entity on whom Being depends for its projection, and thus the starting point for fundamental ontology) is another strategy meant to
However, it does not follow from this that the Real cannot be known at all. As far as Kant's position is concerned, Allison contends that our impossibility to know things-in-themselves can be analytically deduced from the fact that transcendental conditions are determinative of representations. Thus, the “forms of sensibility, or more properly, the content of such forms, must be assigned solely to the cognitive apparatus of the human mind and, therefore, cannot … also be attributed to things considered in themselves” (Allison 1996: 9). This, in turn, is the ground for the famous claim that things-in-themselves can be neither in space nor in time. According to Allison, the two claims (the impossibility of knowing things-in-themselves and the idea that they are neither in time nor in space) do not conflict because while the first refutes the possibility of forming a synthetic knowledge of things-in-themselves, the second rests on an analytic inference from the nature of transcendental determination. Thus, the claim that things-in-themselves are neither in space nor in time “does not involve any synthetic a priori judgment about how things really are in contrast to how they merely seem to us. On the contrary, it involves merely analytic judgments or, perhaps more accurately, methodological directives, which specify how we must conceive of things when we consider them in abstraction from the relation to human sensibility and its a priori forms” (Allison 1983: 241). Heidegger agrees that while entities are fully knowable, the Real cannot be known as it is, independently of Dasein’s mode of access to it. However, the two-aspect view, if taken seriously, entails that phenomena must not be seen as radically distinct from noumena: they are the same things, considered either within a transcendental framework or without. This, in turn, has an important consequence for Heidegger: since entities are not substantially different from the Real, the ontic knowledge we can acquire of entities must somehow pertain to the Real. We cannot say how the properties of entities pertain to the Real, as this would require us to occupy de facto the transcendental standpoint and to form synthetic judgment about the nature of the Real. But although we can never be sure of the ways in which our knowledge applies to the Real, it would nevertheless be wrong to think that our framework does not capture at least some of its properties -- on the contrary, this is analytically entailed by the two aspects view of transcendental idealism. What makes this debatable within the context of Kant's doctrine is that there are other elements in his thought (in particular in the Transcendental Dialectics and in the Second Critique) which incline towards a two-world view. However, Heidegger differs from Kant in that he unequivocally
counter the risk of an absolutisation of our finitude. Similarly, I have suggested that the introduction of “earth” in the Origin of the Artwork could be seen as a reworking of the notion of the Real in Being and Time. See Han-Pile 2003: 120-45.

17 This claim has been criticised by many commentators, in particular Strawson 1989: 60 and the appendix to the book, and Guyer 1987: chapter 16, mainly on the grounds that a) it is not supported by the Transcendental Aesthetic and b) that it clashes with the idea that we cannot know things-in-themselves. See, for example, Kemp-Smith (2003): 113-114. Similar objections were raised in Kant's time, in particular by Mendelssohn (see Allison’s discussion in “The Non spatiality of things-in-themselves for Kant”). I also found a very useful overview of these arguments in the yet unpublished manuscript of Sally Sheldon’s very interesting Ph.D thesis, “The Problematic Meaning of Transcendental Idealism” (Essex, 2001)). Allison’s reply to the first line of criticism is that it is possible to find such evidence in the Transcendental Aesthetic (see Allison 1983, chapter 5). For his reply to the second, see the main text of this paper.
supports the two aspect view. Therefore although metaphysical realism is not a legitimate position for him, the idea that the Real would be by definition completely closed off from us is not acceptable either.

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REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS


