Reply to Gary Gutting’s review of *Foucault's Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical* (the review was published in May 2003 in the “Notre-Dame Philosophical Reviews”, http://ndpr.icaap.org/content/archives/2003/5/gutting-han.html)

Dear Gary,

I think that your review implicitly runs together three different issues:

1. whether Foucault should be read as a philosopher at all (when you say that his works are “primarily works of history, not philosophy in the traditional sense”).

2. assuming that he can be read as a philosopher, whether he can be seen as someone who was concerned with finding his own version of the transcendental in the form of the “historical *a priori*” and its subsequent avatars (when you accuse me of “simply assuming that he has a transcendental project in mind”).

3. if so, whether he succeeds or fails in this attempt (cf. your more specific analyses of my interpretation of archaeology, genealogy and the later texts on subjectivity and experience).

From what I understand, your answer to these three questions is negative: Foucault is not a philosopher, let alone a transcendental one, and whatever methodology he has is not deficient, or at least not for the reasons I mention. As the three issues are imbricated like a set of Russian dolls, I’ll address each in turn. The gist of my answer is that I think that while 1. and 2. can be defended unequivocally, some of my conclusions in 3. can be nuanced (although perhaps not for the reasons you mention). More generally, your review raises the question of what one should look for in philosophy, something for which I am very grateful as it allows me to question my own assumptions. I’ll offer a few reflections on that point at the end.

1. Should Foucault be read as a philosopher?

Perhaps the easiest way to begin is for me to let Foucault speak for himself:

> My whole *philosophical* development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. But I’ve never written anything on Heidegger and only a very short article on Nietzsche. Yet these are the two authors whom I’ve read the most. I think it’s important to have a small number of authors *with whom one thinks*, *with whom one works*, but on whom one doesn’t write. (my italics)\(^1\)

That Foucault should speak of his “philosophical development” (and mention Heidegger and Nietzsche as his intellectual mentors) is hardly a surprise since he was trained as a philosopher at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, did his DEA on Hegel with Jean Hyppolyte, passed the Agrégation de Philosophie, and taught philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Having received the most refined philosophical training possible in France, he wrote extensively on various philosophers, both in his books and in papers — interestingly (re: issue n°2, his interest in the transcendental), I’d say that quantitatively the one he wrote most about is probably Kant\(^2\) followed by Nietzsche (his yet

\(^1\) *Foucault Live*, p. 326.

\(^2\) (the Commentary, many passages in the *Order of Things*, the various versions of “What is Enlightenment” and the substantially different “Was is Aufklärung”, and even in the later works such as in *L’herméneutique du sujet*)
unpublished 1970 course is on Nietzsche), Descartes, but also Husserl, Sartre, Marx, Plato, Marcus Aurelius and other Stoics in his last books. He also mentions a cohort of other philosophers (Fichte, Schelling, Comte, etc.). Furthermore, beyond his sometimes extensive analyses of individual philosophers, Foucault also offered (in the Order of Things) one of the best interpretations I know of the significance of the Copernican turn and its implications for the development of the various strands of philosophy in the XIXth and XXth centuries (the “Analytic of finitude”).

I suppose that one could write about philosophy without being a philosopher (as an historian of ideas, for example). But Foucault hated the history of ideas, which was one of archaeology’s foils; moreover, the quote above shows that in his own view, his very way of thinking was governed by philosophy. This is indicated not only by the many conceptual borrowings he made from various authors (Husserl for the “historical a priori”, Nietzsche for genealogy, even the notion of archaeology is also in Kant), but also by the fact that his work, from beginning to end, is full of explicit or implicit dialogues with philosophers : for example, Husserl on the question of the historical a priori in the Archaeology of Knowledge. James on the issue of truth in Discipline and Punish, Aristotle on causality (as the four modes of subjectivation are obviously related to the theory of the four causes in Physics) or Kant on morality (in the Use of Pleasures), just to mention a few.

In consequence, I strongly disagree with your view that his use of philosophical language is merely a “casual employment of various philosophical vocabularies (...) to add suggestive allusions to his characterizations of his historical project”. For me, to read Foucault in this way is tantamount to weakening his position by making him look like a post-modern amateur, who would dabble irresponsibly with philosophical language without having the knowledge or the skills necessary to back up his use of the terminology. Many of his (numerous!) enemies have taken just this option, and denounced Foucault as an opportunist, who allegedly helped himself to the authority and intellectual weight carried by philosophy without being able to account for the concepts he uses, or the assumptions they carry. In my view, reading him as a philosopher is not only taking into account his own characterization of himself, but also a way of giving his work its full weight.

As to whether his works are “primarily works of history, not philosophy in the traditional sense, I’m not sure what you mean by “traditional sense” — it seems to me that our current situation is characterized by the absence of any agreed upon definition of philosophy, which per se generates some freedom for thought but also difficulties as to the status of the discipline, especially compared to the human sciences (I’ll come back to that at the end). If you mean that he is not a metaphysician, then I agree with you (except for the short 1966-68 period). But it does not follow that he is primarily an historian, nor that there is a mutually exclusive relationship between history and philosophy in his work. That the latter has a strong historical component is obvious, I would never deny it; I also agree with you that among other things, Foucault is “concerned with forging a new approach to historical analysis” (one of the best expressions of which is the “historical nominalism” he defends in ‘L’impossible Prison, perhaps significantly with the help of another philosophical concept). But where we differ on is that for me, this “new approach” is not achieved at the exclusion of philosophy, but from a philosophical point of view, and with philosophical concerns in mind. Foucault himself said as much explicitly :

“If someone wanted to be a philosopher but didn’t ask himself the question, ‘what is knowledge?’, or, ‘what is truth?’, in what sense could one say he was a philosopher? And for all that I may like to say I’m not a philosopher, nonetheless if my concern is with truth then I am still a philosopher” (PK, 66; my italics).

—— page 2 ——

3 In this respect, it is perhaps significant that the acts of the 1989 Foucault colloquium, in which most of participants were favourable to his views, were called Michel Foucault Philosophe, in an attempt to defend him and his work.
So the last word, in Foucault’s own characterization of his approach, goes to philosophy. The reason he gives is particularly interesting for me. Indeed, that Foucault should emphasise so strongly his interest in knowledge and in truth, and link the *philosophical* character of his work to this concern is particularly relevant to my own reading of his work. As you know (and criticize me for), I have focused my interpretation on two claims: firstly, the idea that Foucault’s main project is an inquiry into the conditions of possibility of knowledge (what he calls first the “historical *a priori*” or episteme, then “acceptability”, then “problematisations”), in other words an investigation of what (depending on the epoch) is required for a discourse to be “in the true”, to take up his expression in the *Order of Discourse* (which he uses in a different way from Canguilhem’s). Correlatively, I have read the transition from archaeology to genealogy, and then to the analysis of problematisations as a series of methodological refinements whereby the question of the conditions of possibility of truth claims is refined further and further, from the decontextualised archaeological perspective to the analysis of the non discursive practices in which the space of acceptability is rooted. Since I have taken his concern for truth so seriously (like he himself does), perhaps it is not surprising that I should have read him primarily as a philosopher… but at any rate, I hope to have shown here that it was not without good cause.

One more word before I shift to the question of whether Foucault tries to renew the traditional understanding of the transcendental, which is my second claim. I do not mean to go overboard in the other direction and suggest that he should not be read as a historian *at all*. For all the reasons given above, my view is that he is primarily a philosopher, but he was obviously very concerned both with history and with historiography (but so were many philosophers). Interestingly, he was strongly criticized as a historian by many “traditional” historians (whatever that is!): a typical piece would be “La poussière et le nuage”, for ex. Conversely, P. Veyne is one of the few “acknowledged” historians to have defended him vigorously. Perhaps what makes him most interesting is that he has tried to renew both disciplines. As far as history is concerned, I don’t think that the methodology defined in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* is his strongest contribution (it takes too much from the Ecole des Annales). But he has introduced new concepts (such as that of “discipline”, “objectivation”, “apparatus”, “problematisation”, etc.) and thus disclosed the past in a sometimes amazingly different and fruitful manner (cf. his analysis of the examination, of normalization, etc). His insistence on adopting a nominalist approach and doing away with the referent has also helped to avoid the “mirages of retrospection”, as Bergson would say. As far as philosophy is concerned, he tried to historicise the transcendental, and thus to bring a non traditional answer to one of the most traditional questions of all, that of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. But this takes me back to the issue of transcendental philosophy.

### 2. Can Foucault be read as a philosopher with a transcendental project (in a modified sense)?

Perhaps I should clarify one thing immediately: I never meant to suggest that my reading of Foucault as a “transcendental” philosopher is the only possible, or that he would be nothing but such a philosopher. My perspective is clearly an interpretative one, which is meant to shed some light on his work, but not to encompass it fully (for example I have left out the pre-archaeological works, such as *Madness and Civilisation*, his commentary on Binswanger, etc). However, with these qualifications in mind I do think that a good case can be made for such an interpretation.

That Foucault always had a strong interest in transcendental philosophy is, I think, undeniable. It is clearly shown by the 128p of his commentary on the *Anthropology*\(^4\), chapters VII and IX of the *Order of Discourse*.\(^1\)

---

\(^1\) Speaking of which, I am glad that you think that I have « summarised » Foucault’s *Commentary*, as it suggests that I have reconstructed his argument in a clear and convincing way. However, the text is very difficult and often elliptical. The reconstruction I have presented is an interpretation more than a summary.
of Things, his later texts on Kant, his redefinition of subjectivity in his final interviews. He even wrote his first piece, his DEA, on “The constitution of a historical transcendental in Hegel”, which shows an early and strong interest in the idea of the historical a priori. That he is critical of transcendental philosophy is also true, although it is a more difficult question: while he is critical of the post-Kantians, and in particular of Husserlian phenomenology, Kant’s status retains, as I have shown, the same ambiguity as that of the Copernican turn (which ended the age of representation and opened up a new field of investigation, but may also have in itself fallen prey to anthropology). However, regardless of whether his conclusions are positive or negative, the fact remains that Foucault devoted an important part of his work to discussing transcendental philosophy.

The real issue is that of determining how much his interest for transcendental philosophy has leaked into his own work, in other words whether he has something like a transcendental project. Apart from all the arguments given in the book (especially in the introduction), the most obvious answer to this query is Foucault’s continued interest for what he called the “historical a priori”. Not only was the notion dominant during the archaeological period; it was extensively used by Foucault himself at the end of his life to reconstruct his whole philosophical itinerary. Thus, in his own words his entire research bears on the way in which “the apparition of games of truth has constituted, for given times, areas and individuals, the historical a priori of possible experience”\(^5\). Of course, if one considers his use of the notion of an historical a priori a decorative allusion, then the case for a transcendental project seems absurd; however I hope to have established above that such is not the case, and that Foucault’s use of philosophical concepts is neither amateurish nor merely suggestive; if so, then one has to take seriously the idea that the quest for historical a priori is an attempt to renew transcendental philosophy.

Beyond this terminological dispute, Foucault made it clear, from the early period of the archaeology to his latest writings, that he was interested in the “conditions of possibility of knowledge”\(^6\), or again in the “subject/object relations insofar as they are constitutive of possible knowledge”\(^7\). I would say that regardless of all the other arguments, this emphasis on conditions of possibility and on constitution is per se a strong indication that he has transcendental concerns, as the attempt to account for experience\(^8\) by describing the non empirical conditions of its constitution is characteristic of most forms of transcendental philosophy. In the terms of the Order of Things, Foucault, like Kant himself, is not interested in providing an analysis of the various historical contents of knowledge; he wants to present an analytic of knowledge, i.e: an investigation into the de jure conditions of the various forms of knowledge given in history (the historical a priori, or the épistémès). That he should find these conditions limited in their extension, historically relative and thus variable, or that he should later show that they are dependent on power relations, does not detract anything from the transcendental character of his concern: he still seeks to define them at their own level, keeping equally distant from the Marxist analysis of causal determination and from the phenomenological analyses of subjectivity.

Perhaps the core of our disagreement on this point is that you have a much more narrow understanding of the transcendental than I do, or that Foucault himself does. In your review, you identify the transcendental standpoint as “requiring a very particular conception of the subject, that which Foucault denotes in the Order of Things as “man””. If this was the only way to understand the transcendental, then of course it would make no sense for Foucault to have a transcendental project, since he himself is so critical of the anthropological structure. But the key to understanding his analysis of the historical a priori is to see that he tries to come up with a modified version of transcendental determination, one

---

\(^5\) Dits et écrits, t. IV, p. 632. See also, among other things, “Michel Foucault”, a recapitulative paper that Foucault wrote about himself under the transparent pseudonym of Maurice Florence (see the initials).

\(^6\) OT, 75. Among other places, see p. 31, where Foucault defines “the archaeological level” as that which “makes knowledge [savoir] possible”.

\(^7\) Foucault, Dits et écrits, t. IV, Paris, Gallimard, 1994, p. 632 (my italics)

\(^8\) I am aware that you do not understand the notion as I do. I’ll return to that in a while.
which still tries to account for conditions of possibility for knowledge but does not rest on an *a priori* analysis of subjectivity, and makes much more qualified claims to universality and necessity. Whereas Kant tried to ground the possibility of knowledge by defining the necessary structure of experience, Foucault tries to provide a much less normative and non anthropological account of what is required for something to count as knowledge [savoir]. His problem is not to legitimate a form of universal knowledge (such as physics for Kant), but to understand the conditions that, at any given time, discourses have to obey to be “in the true”. The (modified) transcendental aspect of this analysis lies in his claim that these conditions must be defined at a specific level, distinct from that of the empiricities they govern, and that they are binding for the period concerned. Both his interest in non empirical conditions and his criticism of the traditional understanding of the transcendental come across clearly in the following passage: “[the rules of the historical *a priori* are not constraints whose origin is to be found in the thoughts of men, or in the play of their representations; but nor are they determinations which, formed at the level of institutions, or social or economic relations, transcribe themselves by force on the surface of discourses” (AK, 73-74). Thus the problem for me is not that Foucault should have “lapsed into transcendentalism”, as you put it. On the contrary, given the key position he attributes to the birth of transcendental philosophy in the development of the West and his criticism of the subsequent anthropological appropriations of the transcendental, it seems to me fairly logical that he should try to rescue the transcendental from the doubles of man and try to reinterpret it in his own manner. So my criticism of Foucault does not stem from his having such a project (I actually find it desirable), but rather from what I see as his inability to carry it through.

3. Does Foucault succeed or fail in his reinterpretation of the transcendental?

Here I’ll try to address some of your more specific criticisms, and also to add a few remarks of my own. Re your criticism of Dreyfus’ and Rabinow’s objection, they would be in the best position to answer you themselves. However I shall try to suggest an answer on their behalf. It seems to me that the central question is not whether one has to be conscious of a rule to follow it, but a) whether the rules of the historical *a priori* are a descriptive or prescriptive set of features and b) if they are prescriptive, where their efficacy comes from. Dreyfus and Rabinow both agree with you that “Foucault certainly does not want to say that the rules are followed by the speakers” (MF, 81); they even take up the example of grammar themselves to suggest that compliance to grammatical rules is neither conscious nor reflective (MF, 82). However, they deny that the grammatical model can be extended to social regularities in the sense that it requires either a causal efficacy (Chomsky or Lévi Strauss), or that one should see the rules in a much weaker sense, as merely “descriptive approximations” devised to specify the norms sustained by social practices themselves (Wittgenstein, Heidegger). Both options are rejected by Foucault; the first, because he asserts that the rules must not be understood in terms of causal determination (cf. quote above, AK, 73-74). The second, because of his postulate that the rules can (and must) be analysed at the sole level of discourses, and not in their connection to social practices (these will only be taken into account after the genealogical turn). Therefore, Dreyfus and Rabinow conclude that, as the rules of the historical *a priori* rely neither on physical causality nor on non discursive practices, one should reject the idea that they are prescriptive, and understand them as merely descriptive: they must be “rules which serve to systematise the phenomena, that statements can be given coherence according to them” (MF, 81). However, this conflicts with the many places in which Foucault also attributes to them their own specific efficacy, and claims that the historical *a priori* “makes possible and governs” the formation of discourses (AK, 72), and that statements “obey” (AK, 108) its rules. Therefore Foucault ends up in the difficult position of claiming for the historical *a priori* an efficacy which is excluded by archaeology’s very theoretical

---

9 In other words, Foucault tries to produce a transcendental account of experience, but not to ground the latter universally. Because his approach is not normative, at least in the archaeology, the meaning he gives to the *a priori* is much weaker than in Kant.
premises, hence the “strange notion of regularities which regulate themselves”, which, as I suggested in my book, repeats the structure of the empirico-transcendental double and shows Foucault's inability to find a working version of the transcendental.

As for your objection to my own criticism of the archaeological definition of the historical a priori, you claim that it “would have force only given the gratuitous assumption that a given set of rules can be understood only by giving another set of rules”. However the assumption is neither a general principle (it only applies to the historical a priori), nor a “gratuitous” one; it follows directly from Foucault's text. The first definition of the historical a priori is a “set of rules that characterise a discursive practice”. The discursive practice itself is defined as a “set of anonymous historical rules (...) that determine the conditions of operation of the enunciative function”. When put together, the two definitions introduce a two-tiered system, whereby a first set of rules (the historical a priori) is defined by means of a second set of rules (the discursive practice) — hence the regress10. If, as you say I suggest, “the other set of rules is in fact identical to the first”, the problem is indeed not that the definition generates a regression but, as pointed out on the same page in the book, that it is tautological. Either way, the definition is faulty. Moreover, as I have argued in the book, it is not the only faulty one in the Archaeology of Knowledge.

As far as genealogy is concerned, you mention mainly two issues: the first (that I “simply assume that Foucault must have a transcendental project in mind”) I have already addressed above. I’ll just add here that Foucault's care to identify a specific space of acceptability for truth (to be “in the true”), different from the criteria of predication, and his concern to analyse the discursive regimes or the regimes of truth at their own level, distinct from the empirically accepted truths, these preoccupations indicate that he is still very much concerned with the historical a priori as a set of condition of possibility for the discourses that count as true. The difference with archaeology is not that he would not have a transcendental project anymore (in the modified sense defined above), it is that he now sees these conditions as rooted in the power/knowledge nexus, instead of considering them autonomously, a shift in perspective which requires new forms of analysis (in particular that of objectivation processes).

As for the second issue, if I understand you correctly, you grant my objections but think that they “have force only if we agree that genealogy requires a philosophical foundation”, which you yourself deem unnecessary. You see some evidence of this in the fact that in spite of my own criticisms, I myself acknowledged the fertility of genealogy as a method. On this I have some sympathy for your position, although perhaps I should add that my own is not inconsistent: the fact that Foucault cannot give a good account of the regime of truth does not mean that all his conclusions should be discarded — hence my general praise for his genealogical approach. To get back to your criticism, I would say that it implicitly raises two different questions. The first is whether one, as a philosopher, should be required to be consistent in one’s views; the second is whether a set of philosophical claims can or should receive a foundation (and what such a foundation could be). It seems to me that while the second is open to debate, the first is not, and that the concern for internal consistency is a legitimate requirement (so that a discourse can at least have some claim to truth). On close examination, all the objections of mine you mention bear on issues where Foucault shows himself to be inconsistent (the confusion between the acceptability and predication of truth, the contradiction between essentialism and nominalism in the thinking of power, etc). So I agree with you, I should not have phrased the problem in terms of foundation, but of consistency (although my criticisms remain the same). The reason why I have done so, I think, is that I do believe that some kind of foundation is required for philosophical discourse, and that the search for consistency should be intrinsic to such a project. But I’ll get back to this at the end.

---

10 And an example of what is traditionally called the « homunculus sophism », whereby entities introduced to elucidate a problem reproduce its structure on a smaller scale, and thus generate a regression.
Re: Foucault's final “return to the subject” and the question of experience, there are many things to discuss. Of course, “bringing into discussion the individuals that are the subjects of knowledge” does not require adopting a transcendental standpoint. What does require it, though, is Foucault's description of the formation of subjectivity in terms of a constitution, itself described as a necessary and a priori structure. As I have tried to show, although the contents of subjectivation vary (as the models offered for the constitution of the self change with history), its form remains invariant. Whatever the epoch, it requires a relationship to truth, a process of recognition and the use of specific etho-poietical practices to incorporate the model into one’s ethical substance. Moreover, the primacy of consciousness in subjectivation is emphasised by Foucault not only with respect with Antiquity, but in general — hence the tension I noted with his former genealogical findings. So while I agree with you that per se “freedom and reflection need not be read as the technical terms of idealist philosophy”, I would maintain that the later Foucault does revert to such an idealist position, and therefore to the kind of transcendentalism that he himself had so extensively criticised. The alternative to this reversal would have been to bring about a viable reinterpretation of transcendental determination; this, I think, is what Foucault tried to do in his reinterpretation of experience as a “correlation, in a culture, between fields of knowledge, types of normativity and forms of subjectivity” (UP, 4-5). However, as I have tried to show, there are many problems with this definition; in particular, Foucault's definition of experience as an “objective correlation” rests in fact on the above mentioned subjective understanding of experience as the constitution of the self.

More generally, I have to disagree most strongly with your suggestion that I “unfortunately ignore Foucault's detailed discussion of experience in other contexts, in particular that of the philosophy of science”. From the terminology of your brief reconstruction, I gather that the text you refer to is “La vie, l’expérience, la science”. If only because of its title, which promised some light on Foucault's understanding of experience, I did consider it eagerly! However I decided not to use it for two main reasons. Firstly, contrary to what the title suggests, there is very little about experience in it (the term itself only occurs three times in the whole paper). Secondly, and more importantly, the text was written as a preface to the English edition of Canguilhem’s *The Normal and the Pathological*, and later republished in French in an issue of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* dedicated to Canguilhem. Apart from the beginning, where Foucault reflects on the status of the philosophy of science in the XXth Century, the rest of the paper is dedicated to introducing some of the main themes of Canguilhem’s thought: therefore the views subsequently expressed apply to Canguilhem, not to Foucault's own position. This is particularly true of the one you mention, i.e the idea that freedom is “rooted in the deviations (errors) of an organism acting in a strong field of bio-social forces”. This is explicitly referred by Foucault to Canguilhem’s approach, itself seen as a “philosophy of error, of the concept of the living, as another way to approach the notion of life” (*Dits et Ecrits*, IV, 776). Moreover, even in this context there is nothing about a “field of bio-social forces” in the paper. The “error” in question is defined in strictly biological terms, as a mutation (“an alea which, before being an illness, a deficit or a monstrosity, is something like a perturbation in the informative system, something like a ‘mistake’” (ibid, 774). So I’m afraid that I can’t agree with you on the usefulness of this piece to understand *Foucault's* conception of experience, and I don’t see any other “detailed discussion” that I have ignored.

However, my strong disagreement with you on this last point should not obscure the fact that I am very grateful for your review, which overall I found very considerate. It raised very interesting issues and has allowed me to specify the reasons why and the sense in which Foucault can be said to have a transcendental project. The last question I would like to discuss briefly is that of philosophical foundation. You’re right that, independently of the reconstructions I have offered, many of my criticisms implicitly rest on the idea that archaeology and genealogy need foundations that Foucault fails to provide. I’ll readily grant that this is per se a debatable assumption, the validity of which depends on what is meant by “foundation”. Obviously, there can be no foundation in the sense of a
metaphysical ground, an underlying principle which would unify the whole of Foucault's thought in such a way that all his assertions could be traced back, one way or another, to that ground. I never had in mind a metaphysical understanding of that kind, which, especially after the Kantian and Heideggerian critiques of metaphysics would be very difficult to sustain anyway. But conversely, I disagree with the Post-modern idea that philosophy should be seen as a tank from where one could help oneself without any care for the context in which concepts were originally used, nor for the assumptions they carry. If philosophy is to retain its specificity as a discipline, it must obey certain requirements. The nature of these is not only very difficult to define; it is also a burning topic, which divides resolutely post-modern authors from more classical ones. On this matter I side with the classicists. Some of the criteria I would look for are formal (mainly internal consistency, which in turn requires the ability to clarify one’s assumptions and unify them with one’s conclusions, exactitude of references and translations, critical apparatus) and some, less so (philosophy’s ability to describe or explain phenomena in a new or different light). I would say that while Foucault often succeeded on the second issue, especially in the genealogical period, he did not always do well on the first, mostly because he is often inconsistent, and his conclusions sometimes do not match his premises. However, as I have said earlier I do not claim that reading him as a (modified) transcendental philosopher is the only possible reading (and in the articles I have subsequently written about him, I have tried to explore other dimensions of his work\textsuperscript{11}). Although he may have failed to find a viable version of the historical \textit{a priori}, he still has contributed a lot to philosophy and to history.